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THE ENFORCEMENT OF IRS SUMMONSES
AND SECTION 7609
MADELINE TUSA†
INTRODUCTION
When Thomas More wrote of his version of Utopia, he
envisioned a world in which “all laws are promulgated for this
end, that every man may know his duty; and therefore the
plainest and most obvious sense of the words is that which ought
be put upon them.”1 Of course, More’s world did not have the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) or the Internal Revenue Code
(the “Code”). The taxpayer interest in avoiding burdensome
intrusion and the IRS interest in obtaining necessary
information has made a plain interpretation of the tax code
infeasible. This struggle, however, is nothing new.2 History has
revealed that the dominance of each interest has shifted based on
societal need: In times of trouble, the need for revenue takes
over; in calmer times, taxpayer interests are given more weight.3
Which interest has prominence at any given time “affects
legislative, regulatory, and judicial actions; it implicates not just
substantive rules of tax liability and tax rates but also styles of
statutory interpretation and the rules and devices of tax
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SIR THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 83 (The Columbian Publishing Co. 1891) (1516).
2
Steve R. Johnson, Reforming Federal Tax Litigation: An Agenda, 41 FLA. ST.
U. L. REV. 205, 205–206 (2013) (comparing the struggle to balance the “facilitation of
revenue collection and fairness to taxpayers” to an old tale in which a red dragon
and a white dragon fight perpetually for dominance beneath the earth’s surface,
causing the ground to rumble and making any construction thereon impossible). The
IRS is not the only administrative agency struggling to balance individual and
agency interests. See SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 736 (1984)
(recognizing the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (“SEC”) interest in
preventing targets of SEC investigations from destroying documents, intimidating
witnesses, and hiding evidence).
3
Johnson, supra note 2, at 206.
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procedure.”4 The United States Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Powell is an example of an attempt to balance
these interests. 5
The IRS, part of the United States Department of the
Treasury, is interested in ensuring that citizens meet their tax
obligations.6 In fact, the IRS is among “the world’s most efficient
tax administrators.”7 The IRS is so efficient partly because of its
broad statutory authority.8 Part of that power includes the
ability to use summonses to determine taxpayer liability.9 The
summonses, however, are not self-enforcing.10 Thus, if a party
ignores or refuses to comply with a summons, the IRS must bring
a proceeding to have it enforced.11 At such a proceeding, a
taxpayer may contest the summons on several grounds, but to do
so successfully requires satisfying an extremely high burden.12
One of the ways a taxpayer may contest a summons
enforcement is to claim that the IRS did not follow proper
“administrative steps” when it issued late notice of a summons,
violating Section 7609(a) of the Code.13 Section 7609(a) requires
notice to taxpayers when summonses are served on third parties
for purposes of an IRS investigation of the taxpayer.14 However,
taxpayers have largely been unsuccessful in using Section 7609
violations to quash summonses.15 Whether or not this notice
requirement is a mandatory step that, if not followed, would be
grounds for quashing a summons has split the circuits. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Eleventh, and
Sixth Circuits have ruled that failure to comply with the notice
requirement is not grounds for quashing a summons as long as
the “totality of the circumstances” indicates a good faith effort on
4

Id.
379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964) (creating four factors the government must meet to
enforce an administrative summons).
6
The Agency, its Mission and Statutory Authority, IRS.GOV, https://www.irs.gov/
uac/The-Agency-its-Mission-and-Statutory-Authority (last visited June 5, 2017).
7
Id. In 2015, “the IRS collected almost $3.3 trillion in revenue,” spending only
35 cents for every $100 collected. Id.
8
See 26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2) (2012).
9
See id. § 7602(a)(3).
10
Id. § 7604(b) (2012).
11
Id.
12
See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964).
13
See id. (requiring administrative agencies to follow all proper “administrative
steps” in the enforcement of summonses).
14
26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012).
15
See, e.g., Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008).
5
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behalf of the IRS and a lack of taxpayer prejudice.16 In contrast,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled
that the language of the statute makes notice of a third-party
summons a mandatory requirement, and therefore failure to
strictly comply with the statute will be grounds to quash a
summons.17
The circuit courts adopting the totality of the circumstances
approach based their conclusions on a balancing of competing
interests.18 On one hand, forcing the IRS to reissue summonses
because of improper notice would use up valuable IRS resources
only to end up in the same place.19 Further, in a system relying
on individuals self-reporting, the IRS’s ability to obtain
information is a “crucial backstop.”20 The Powell decision works
to reinforce that backstop by “reduc[ing] informational
asymmetry between the parties, so that administrative and
judicial determinations on the merits can be made on something
approaching a level playing field.”21
On the other hand, the Code takes taxpayer interests into
consideration.
First, constraining the IRS’s ability to get
information “would “enable ‘dishonest persons to escape taxation,
thus shifting heavier burdens to honest taxpayers.’ ”22 Second, if
a taxpayer believes a third-party summons was improperly
issued, she has a right to initiate a proceeding to quash the
summons.23 Once that proceeding has begun, the statutory
period of twenty-three days before examination is paused until
either the court makes a determination or the taxpayer
consents.24 Taxpayers must strictly comply with the

16
See id.; Azis v. U.S. I.R.S., 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013); Cook v.
United States, 104 F.3d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1997).
17
See Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (10th Cir. 2014).
18
Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161; Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777; Cook, 104 F.3d at 889.
19
See Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161.
20
United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361, 2367 (2014).
21
Johnson, supra note 2, at 226.
22
Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2367 (quoting United States v. Biscelgia, 420 U.S. 141,
146 (1975).
23
26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A) (2012).
24
Id. § 7609(d)(2). The petition to quash must be filed within a twenty-day
period and copies must be mailed to the third party and the IRS. Id. § 7609(b)(2)(B).
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requirements needed to initiate a proceeding to quash;25 however,
it is important to note that summons enforcement is not a
determination on the merits.26
This Note argues that because the Tenth Circuit decision
ignores important policy concerns dealing with the efficiency of
the IRS, failing to comply with notice requirements under
Section 7609(a) should be analyzed under the totality of the
circumstances standard.
Part I discusses the history and
development of Section 7609(a) and notice requirements for
third-party summonses in IRS investigations. Part II outlines
the general requirements for the enforcement of an IRS
summons and how Section 7609(a) is analyzed in light of those
requirements. Part III discusses the current circuit split and the
significance of each respective court’s holdings and reasoning.
Part IV argues that the Tenth Circuit’s approach, while
providing more leverage for taxpayers, ignores important policy
arguments. It also argues that the Second, Eleventh, and Sixth
Circuits’ totality of the circumstances approach to Section
7609(a) violations is more appropriate. Finally, it discusses a
number of factors that may improve that approach.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SECTION 7609 AND THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENT

Section 7609 requires the IRS to give notice to taxpayers
when it issues third-party subpoenas in an investigation of the
taxpayer, and although the requirements of Section 7609 have
expanded over time, those changes have coincided with the
continuing belief that strict compliance with those requirements
is not necessary. Although today the IRS is required to give
notice of third-party summonses, this has not been true
historically.27 It was not until the United States Congress

25
Fogelson v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 573, 574 (D. Kan. 1983) (explaining
that even where a taxpayer notified the third party by telephone, making delivery of
a hard copy of the petition to quash redundant, “[f]ailure of the complainant to mail
by registered or certified mail a copy of the petition to the persons summoned not
later than 20 days from the receipt of notice requires dismissal of the
complaint . . .”).
26
See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 450 (1964). Enforcing a summons allows
the IRS to obtain information; it does not seal the taxpayer’s fate.
27
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., SUMMARY OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF
1976 61 (Comm. Print 1976).

2017]

THE ENFORCEMENT OF IRS SUMMONSES

283

enacted Section 7609 in 1976 that taxpayers received this right.28
The version of Section 7609 enacted in 1976 required the IRS to
notify a taxpayer of summonses issued to “third-party
recordkeeper[s]” so taxpayers had an opportunity to contest the
summons.29 A third-party recordkeeper included: banks, credit
unions, consumer reporting agencies, individuals extending
credit through credit cards, brokers, lawyers, accountants, barter
exchanges, and regulated investment companies.30 If the party
served was not considered a third-party recordkeeper under the
statute, the taxpayer would have no right to notice or to
intervene in a proceeding to enforce the summons.31 Further
exceptions to the application of Section 7609 included records of a
party that relate to its status as such, even though the party was
indeed a third-party recordkeeper.32
After the enactment of the 1998 IRS Reform Act, the IRS
was given greater notice responsibilities.33 Instead of merely
applying to third-party recordkeepers, Section 7609 now applied
to almost all third parties served.34 Congress believed that
expanding the notice requirement “will ensure that taxpayers
will receive notice and an opportunity to contest any summons
issued to a third party in connection with the determination of
their tax liability.”35 The more expansive Section 7609 provides,
in relevant part:
If any summons to which this section applies requires the giving
of testimony on or relating to, the production of any portion of
records made or kept on or relating to, or . . . with respect to,
any person (other than the person summoned) who is identified
in the summons, then notice of the summons shall be given to
any person so identified within 3 days of the day on which such

28

26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012).
Id.
30
Id. § 7609(a)(3).
31
See id. § 7609(a)(1).
32
See United States v. Exxon Co., 450 F. Supp. 472, 477 (D. Md. 1978).
33
See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105–206 (1998) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012)).
34
26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012).
35
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF TAX LEGIS.
ENACTED IN 1998 (Comm. Print 1998). This is important because the information
sought in third-party summonses goes towards the determination of a taxpayer’s tax
liability, making notice an important tool for taxpayers to attempt to limit that
liability.
29
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service is made, but no later than the 23rd day before the day
fixed in the summons as the day upon which such records are to
be examined.36

Under common rules of statutory interpretation, the “shall” in
Section 7609(a) would connote a mandatory requirement.37
However, even though Section 7609(a) was meant to expand
notice requirements and give taxpayers greater opportunity to
contest summonses, courts have generally been unwilling to
quash a summons based solely on a Section 7609(a) violation,
dismissing it as a mere technical error.38
Additionally, greater notice requirements were not meant to
dilute the power of the IRS to obtain needed information.39 For
example, Section 7609(g) contains situations in which the IRS
may seek to be excused from the Section 7609 notice
requirements.40 The IRS may forgo notice to the taxpayer if it
presents reasonable cause that notice may lead the taxpayer to
attempt to: (1) “conceal, destroy or alter records,” (2) use
“intimidation, bribery, or collusion” to “prevent the
communication of information,” or (3) “flee to avoid prosecution,
testifying, or production of records.”41 Thus, while the drafters of
Section 7609 were concerned with the right of taxpayers to
receive notice of and contest a summons, they were also highly
aware of the importance of IRS ability to obtain information on
tax liability. The case law directly following Section 7609 reflects
a continuing struggle to balance these competing interests.

36

Id. § 7609(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
The canons of statutory interpretation include the employment of “shall”
when action is mandatory and “may” when action is permissive. See NORMAN J.
SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 21:8,
at 172 (7th ed. 2009).
38
See Kellogg v. Rossotti, No. 03CV0055 BTM(LSP), 2003 WL 21224782, at *4
(S.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2003) (explaining that strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 7609 is not necessary for the IRS to survive a motion to quash if the IRS
made a good faith effort to provide timely notice and if the taxpayer was not
prejudiced by the late notice).
39
Azis v. U.S. I.R.S., 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing United
States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)) (“[N]othing in the
language of the Internal Revenue Code mandates the non-enforcement of an IRS
summons because of an infringement of the Code.”).
40
26 U.S.C. § 7609(g) (2012).
41
Id.
37
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II. UNITED STATES V. POWELL: FOUR REQUIREMENTS TO
ENFORCE ADMINISTRATIVE SUMMONSES
In United States v. Powell,42 the United States Supreme
Court set an extremely high standard for petitions to quash the
enforcement of IRS summonses, tipping the scale in favor of IRS
authority over taxpayer rights.43 There, the IRS summoned Max
Powell, the President of William Penn Laundry (“William Penn”),
to appear before an IRS agent to give testimony and produce
records regarding William Penn’s tax returns.44 Powell refused
to produce the requested documents on the grounds that the IRS
had previously examined those records and that the statute of
limitations barred examination in this circumstance except in the
case of fraud.45 The IRS then sought the enforcement of the
administrative summons for production of the records under
Section 7604(b), which allows the IRS to seek court enforcement
of a summons when the person served fails to comply with that
summons.46 The IRS claimed that re-examination of the records
was needed because of suspected fraud on two years of tax
returns.47 Powell objected, claiming that the IRS must show
probable cause for suspecting fraud pursuant to Section 7605(b),
which protects taxpayers from “unnecessary examination or
investigations.”48
The district court disagreed with Powell, holding that
probable cause was not necessary to enforce a summons that
would permit the re-examination of records.49 However, the court
of appeals reversed the decision, holding that the IRS cannot reexamine records “unless [it] possessed information ‘which might
cause a reasonable man to suspect that there has been fraud in
the return . . . ; and whether this standard has been met is
decided ‘on the basis of the showing made in the normal course of
an adversary proceeding.’ ”50

42

379 U.S. 48 (1964).
Id. at 57–58.
44
Id. at 49.
45
Id.
46
Id.; 26 U.S.C. § 7604(b).
47
Powell, 379 U.S. at 50.
48
Id. at 50, 52.
49
Id. at 50.
50
Id. Because Section 7604(b) requires a hearing where “satisfactory proof”
should be made, the court of appeals reasoned that it could not determine whether
43
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To settle the issue of whether probable cause was needed to
enforce the summons, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
1964.51 The Court ultimately reversed the court of appeals,
holding that Section 7605(b) did not require a showing of
probable cause for suspicion of fraud to enforce an administrative
summons brought under Section 7604(b).52 Rather, to avoid the
enforcement of the summons, the taxpayer must show that
enforcement would be “an abusive use of the court’s process.”53
Thus, the taxpayer has the burden of proving that the IRS failed
on one of the following four elements: (1) “that the investigation
will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose,” (2) “that the
inquiry may be relevant to the purpose,” (3) “that the information
sought is not already within the Commissioner’s possession,” and
(4) “that the administrative steps required by the Code have been
followed.”54
In coming to its conclusion, the Court recognized that
although it had set a high standard for taxpayers to meet, it did
“not make meaningless the adversary hearing to which the
taxpayer is entitled before enforcement is ordered.”55 The Court
explained that a taxpayer could meet its burden, for example, “if
the summons had been issued . . . for any . . . purpose reflecting
on the good faith of the particular investigation.”56 Thus, the
Court seemed to suggest that an important part of the analysis is
a consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the
investigation, both taxpayer and IRS interests alike.
After the Powell decision, lower courts have used the
standard that was set for the enforcement of an IRS summons
pursuant to Section 7605(b) as the standard for the enforcement
of summonses pursuant to other sections of the Code as well as

such proof has been presented without the IRS disclosing what created its suspicion
of fraud. United States v. Powell, 325 F.2d 914, 916 (3d Cir. 1963).
51
Powell, 379 U.S. at 50–51.
52
Id. at 51.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 57–58.
55
Id. at 58. Whereas the taxpayer must make more than a “mere showing” that
there had been “an abuse of the court’s process,” the IRS must only present a prima
facie showing that it fulfilled the requirements. Id. at 57–58. The dissent argued,
however, that without a “minimum safeguard” of requiring more from the IRS on its
suspicion of fraud, the statute would become “rather meaningless.” Id. at 60
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
56
Powell, 379 U.S. at 58 (majority opinion) (emphasis added).
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summonses from other administrative agencies.57 There is no
debate among circuits that Powell does in fact apply to all kinds
of administrative summonses.58 There is, however, debate as to
how to interpret a violation of Section 7609 in a Powell analysis.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: TWO APPROACHES IN APPLYING POWELL
TO SECTION 7609
Although Section 7609 is an administrative step under
Powell, circuits have not consistently regarded Section 7609 as
an administrative step that requires strict compliance. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second, Eleventh, and
Sixth Circuits chose to analyze a Section 7609 violation under a
“totality of the circumstances” approach, while the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit mandates strict
compliance with the notice requirements.59 These contrary
approaches further demonstrate the conflict of interests at play
in the enforcement of IRS summonses.
A.

The Totality of the Circumstances Approach

The Second, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits have attempted to
balance the IRS’s interest in obtaining information on taxpayers
against the taxpayer’s interests in receiving proper notice by
adopting a totality of the circumstances approach, which defers
substantially to the authority of the IRS. Each circuit ultimately
enforced the summons in question.
For example, in Adamowicz v. United States, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied the
taxpayers’ petition to quash several third-party summonses
57
For example, the four factors from Powell have been used to determine
whether a summons issued in the course of a SEC investigation should be enforced.
SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 747–49 (1984). The target of an SEC
investigation sought to quash a third-party summons issued without his prior notice,
relying on Powell’s requirement that all “administrative steps” be followed. Id. at
747. The Court ruled that Powell did apply to the enforcement of SEC summonses,
but because no statute mandated the SEC to issue notice in its investigations into
federal securities law violations, the summons would be enforced. Id. at 751.
Explaining further, the Court relied on many of the concerns the IRS faces, such as
the burden to the agency and the courts and the possibility that notice would
facilitate individuals to impede the investigatory process. Id. at 749–51.
58
See United States v. Clarke, 134 S. Ct. 2361 (2014).
59
See Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008); Azis v. U.S.
I.R.S., 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013); Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886,
889 (6th Cir. 1997).
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because they failed to show that the IRS’s violation of the Code,
under a totality of the circumstances approach, was a basis to
quash.60 There, an IRS agent issued third-party summonses in
an investigation of the estate and gift tax liability of the
decedent, Mary Adamowicz.61
The investigation was to
determine if Mary gave monetary gifts to family members before
she died that should have been taxed.62 The IRS issued
summonses to Mary’s children, who were also the executors of
her estate, Michael Adamowicz and Elizabeth Fraser.63 A
summons was also sent to Mary’s bank, Roslyn Savings Bank.64
Mary’s children refused to produce a number of documents
requested and argued, among other things, “that the IRS failed
to follow proper administrative procedures,” including failure to
timely notify parties in violation of Section 7609.65 The IRS
argued that untimely notice is an improper basis for quashing
the summonses because the parties were not prejudiced.66
The court concluded, “minor notice violations are not a basis
for quashing a summons.”67 It found no reason to depart from
other courts that “have ‘declined to elevate form over substance
and have rejected the suggestion that every infringement of a
requirement of the Internal Revenue Code absolutely precludes
enforcement of an IRS summons.’ ”68 Thus, the court relied on
the standard used by various other circuits and adopted the
totality of the circumstances approach.69 Factors to consider
under this standard are: “[T]he seriousness of the infringement,
the harm or prejudice, if any, caused thereby, and the
government’s good faith.”70 In applying this test, the court found
that the taxpayers showed no evidence that they had been
“harmed or prejudiced” by the late notice.71 The court noted that
the purpose of Section 7609 is to provide taxpayers with enough
60

Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161–62.
Id. at 154.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 160–61.
66
Id. at 161.
67
Id.
68
Id. (quoting United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir.
1980)).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 162.
61
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time to commence an action to quash a summons, and as there
was “no question” the taxpayers knew about the summonses with
enough time to question them if they chose to, they were not
prejudiced.72 Further, the court found no bad faith on behalf of
the IRS even though there were multiple summonses in the case
that failed to meet Section 7609(a) requirements.73
Similarly, in Azis v. United States Internal Revenue Service,74
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held
that the taxpayer failed to show specific harm resulting from the
shortened time he had to petition to quash a summons, and
therefore was not prejudiced by the Section 7609(a) violation.75
There, Jeffrey Azis was being audited by the IRS regarding his
accounting and consulting business.76 During the investigation,
the IRS issued summonses to banks where Azis held business
accounts.77 In response, Azis sought to quash the summonses on
various grounds, including that the summonses violated Section
7609(a) and therefore did not meet the Powell requirements.78
Azis was not given complete copies of the summonses within the
appropriate time, as the copies he received were missing a list of
the specific records sought from the banks.79 The IRS agent who
made the error had been out of town and eventually faxed the list
to Azis seven days later, failing to meet the statutory notice
The IRS argued that the violation was
requirement.80
inadvertent and did not result in taxpayer prejudice.81

72

Id.
Id. at 154; cf. Larson v. United States, No. CV 91-151-BLG-JDS, 1992 WL
104791, at *2, *4 (D. Mont. Mar. 30, 1992) (holding that because there were
numerous violations of the Code in the issuance of summonses, and because the IRS
failed to show that it would be prejudiced should it have to reissue the summonses
properly, the summonses were quashed).
74
522 F. App’x 770 (11th Cir. 2013).
75
Id. at 777.
76
Id. at 772.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 776; see 26 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (2012) (requiring a request for the
production of books, papers, records, or other data to describe such materials with
reasonable certainty).
80
Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777.
81
Id. at 773.
73
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The Court concluded that the IRS met its burden under
Powell, because the failure to provide the full summonses “ ‘was
quickly cured and no prejudice resulted,’ ”82 and the error “ ‘was,
at most, technical and not serious.’ ”83 The court reasoned that,
despite the IRS’s error, Azis was not prejudiced by the delay
because he still had notice of the summons with sufficient time to
file a petition to quash, and he showed no evidence of harm
resulting from the delay.84 Thus, the circumstances did not
suggest that taxpayer interests were diminished such that the
IRS should have to reissue the summons.85
Finally, in Cook v. United States,86 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that late notice imputed no
prejudice to a taxpayer who had already pleaded guilty to two
criminal tax evasion charges, and that the “equitable resolution”
dictates that late notice alone cannot form the basis to quash an
IRS summons.87 There, the IRS was investigating a married
couple’s tax returns for embezzlement and money laundering
shortly after the husband had been sentenced for evading
personal income taxes and for diverting corporate funds “as
fictitious business deductions.”88 During the investigation, the
IRS issued a summons to a third-party bank to retrieve the
couple’s bank records.89 The couple then petitioned to challenge
the summons on the basis that they received notice of the
summons one day later than the statutory time period required
under Section 7609(a).90
In reaching its conclusion, the court examined the language
of the statute itself.91 The court noted that Section 7609(a) uses
“shall,” which usually “signifies that Congress intended strict
and nondiscretionary application of the statute.”92 However, the
court reasoned absent “a clear legislative statement,” it could not
discern congressional intent to void every third-party summons
82
Id. at 777 (quoting United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066
(5th Cir. 1980)).
83
Id. (quoting United States v. Payne, 648 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1981)).
84
Id. at 777.
85
Id.
86
104 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 1997).
87
Id. at 887, 889.
88
Id. at 887–88.
89
Id. at 887.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 889.
92
Id. (citing Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)).
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that did not comply with “every technical stricture of [S]ection
7609.”93 The court pointed out not only that the taxpayers were
not prejudiced, but also that quashing the summons would be an
“exercise in futility.”94 To quash the summons would only compel
the IRS to issue a new third-party summons with proper notice,
achieving the same result as denying the petition to quash but
with the additional time and resources needed to issue it a
second time.95 Thus, courts have discretion to excuse a technical
notice violation when the circumstances reflect an absence of
taxpayer prejudice and IRS bad faith.96
B.

The “Strict Compliance” Approach

In contrast to the totality of the circumstances approach, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit construes
“shall” in Section 7609(a) as mandatory and requires strict
compliance with the statute, giving more deference to taxpayer
rights. In Jewell v. United States,97 the court granted four
petitions to quash summonses when it held that the statutory
language of Section 7609(a) does not give courts discretion to
excuse a violation.98 There, the IRS was investigating several
As part of the
nursing homes owned by Sam Jewell.99
investigation, the IRS sent summonses to four banks, two in the
Eastern District of Oklahoma, and two in the Western District of
Oklahoma.100 Mr. Jewell received late notice of these summonses
and filed petitions to quash in the Eastern and Western
93
Id. (explaining that voiding every summons that included technical violations
of Section 7609(a) would create a greatly inefficient system that would be contrary to
public policy).
94
Id.
95
Id. at 890.
96
Id. In excusing the technical violation in this case, the court was compelled to
warn the IRS that these types of technical violations will be increasingly scrutinized.
Id. at 890–91; see also United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that although it would be a waste of resources to have the IRS start the
entire process over again in this case, the IRS now has notice that it must comply
with the Code in the future). These warnings, however, seem to be empty threats
caught in a circular logic. See Boyd v. United States, 87 F. App’x 481, 485 (6th Cir.
2003) (dismissing a taxpayers claim that, based on the decision in Cook, summonses
filed late should be quashed because the technical violation did not prejudice the
taxpayer).
97
749 F.3d 1295 (10th Cir. 2014).
98
Id. at 1297.
99
Id.
100
Id.
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Districts.101 The Eastern District granted Mr. Jewell’s petition,
explaining “that the plain language of Section 7609(a)(1)”
requires the IRS to give notice to taxpayers of third-party
summonses at least twenty-three days before the records are
produced, and thus the eighteen day notice given in this case was
reason enough to quash the summons.102 The Western District
denied Mr. Jewell’s petition, explaining that although the notice
was three days late, because the taxpayer had time to file a
petition to quash and have his complaint considered by the court,
there was no reason to quash the summons.103
The Tenth Circuit resolved this split in authority by
conducting a careful analysis of the meaning of “shall” in Section
7609(a) and the meaning of “administrative steps” in the Powell
decision.104 The court premised its analysis with a canon of
statutory interpretation: “If the plain language of the statute is
clear, our inquiry ordinarily ends.”105 With this canon in mind,
the court moved to the meaning of the word “shall,” which it
explained plainly denotes “a mandatory intent.”106
The government, in an effort to rebut the court’s argument,
relied on two cases where an exception to the definition of “shall”
was recognized.107 One of the cases the government relied on was
Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co.,108 where the Commissioner of
Social Security was obliged by statute to assign a company that
would fund benefits for retired coal industry workers eligible for
those benefits.109 The other case relied on was Dolan v. United
States,110 where a district court was obliged by statute to

101

Id.
Jewell v. United States, No. 12-CV-424-JHP, 2013 WL 870079, at *3 (E.D.
Okla. Mar. 7, 2013).
103
Jewell v. United States, No. CIV-12-1125-C, 2013 WL 752625, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 27, 2013).
104
Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1298–00.
105
Id. at 1298.
106
Id.
107
Id.
108
537 U.S. 149 (2003).
109
Id. at 150. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a) (2012) states that the Commissioner of Social
Security “shall” assign every retired coal industry worker eligible for benefits under
the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act to a company that would then be
responsible for funding the benefits.
110
560 U.S. 605 (2010).
102
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determine the restitution owed to the defendant.111 In both cases,
the government was also required to follow statutory deadlines in
the execution of their obligations.112 The government failed in
both cases to meet their deadline obligations, but both courts
excused the noncompliance because the government’s underlying
obligations of assigning benefits to retired coal industry workers
and determining restitution owed to defendants were more
important.113
The Jewell Court distinguished those cases from the facts
before it.114 It reasoned that because the IRS was not statutorily
required to issue summons, like the Commissioner of Social
Security in Barnhart was required to assign benefits and the
district court in Dolan was required to determine restitution,
there was no mandatory intent to conflict with the notice
requirement, and thus, no reason to make an exception to the
canon of statutory interpretation that “shall” connotes
mandatory action.115
The court then concluded that according to its plain meaning
the mandatory notice requirement is an “administrative step”
under Powell.116 “Administrative” is defined as “[p]ertaining to,
or dealing with, the conduct or management of affairs.”117 Thus,
even if late notice were simply a technical violation, it would still
fall under this broad definition.118 Having found that notice is
mandatory and an “administrative step” was not followed, the
court ruled that the IRS did not make a prima facie showing that
would enable the court to enforce the summons.119
111
Id. at 605. The Mandatory Victims Restitution Act states a court “shall” set a
date for determining a victim’s losses no later than ninety days after sentencing if
such losses cannot be determined ten days before sentencing. Id.
112
Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1299.
113
Id. The court posed the following questions:
“In Barnhart, did the failure to timely comply mean that the Social
Security Commissioner no longer had to designate a company to fund
benefits for retirees entitled to benefits? And, in Dolan, did the district
court’s failure to timely comply mean that the victim would no longer get
the restitution that Congress said he was owed?” Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. The IRS “shall” give notice of third-party summonses, but is only
“authorized” to issue summonses. See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(a) (2012); Id. § 7602(a)(2)
(2012).
116
Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1299–00.
117
Id. at 1299 (quoting THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 163 (2d ed. 1989)).
118
Id. at 1300.
119
Id.
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IV. THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES: THE MORE EFFICIENT
APPROACH

Because Jewell ignores important policy concerns dealing
with the functionality and efficiency of the IRS, and because
other taxpayer protections are built into the Code, the failure to
comply with notice requirements under Section 7609(a) should be
analyzed under the “totality of the circumstances” standard.
This is not to say that the notice requirements are rendered
meaningless, but rather, that the notice requirements are part of
a larger statutory scheme that serves an important societal
purpose that cannot be ignored. However, an analysis of the
totality of the circumstances should include more factors than
those used by jurisdictions that currently adopt this approach.
A.

Statutory Interpretation: A Different Look at Jewell’s
Analysis of “Shall”

The Jewell Court placed heavy emphasis on the mandatory
intent behind the word “shall,”120 but overlooked policy reasons
for providing leniency to the IRS and an argument for making an
exception to that interpretation. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that “shall”
is not mandatory under Section 7609(a), reasoning that imposing
strict compliance would not thwart the IRS from fulfilling its
underlying obligation.121 The court, however, overlooked an
important section of the Code when it found no obligations
conflicting with the “shall” in Section 7609(a).
While the Code gives the IRS broad powers, it also entrusts
the IRS with many responsibilities. It is true that the IRS is not
mandated to issue summonses.
The Code gives the IRS
authority to issue summonses, and states that it is:
“authorized . . . [t]o summon the person liable for tax or
required to perform the act, or any officer or employee of such
person, or any person having possession, custody, or care of
books of account containing entries relating to the business of
the person liable for tax or required to perform the act, or any
other person the Secretary may deem proper . . . .”122

120
121
122

Id. at 1298.
Id. at 1299.
26 U.S.C. § 7602(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
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Under the language of the statute, it appears as though the IRS
is not required to issue summonses in their investigations.
However, a broader look at the Code as a whole may reveal a
conflict of mandatory intents, although not as direct as those in
Barnhart and Dolan.123 For example, Section 6201(a) of the Code
provides that the IRS is:
“authorized and required to make the inquiries, determinations,
and assessments of all taxes (including interest, additional
amounts, additions to the tax, and assessable penalties)
imposed by this title, or accruing under any former internal
revenue law.”124

The section further states that the IRS “shall assess all taxes
determined by the taxpayer . . . as to which returns or lists are
made under this title,”125 requiring the IRS to investigate and
assess which taxes are owed to the United States government.
This is the underlying obligation the IRS seeks to fulfill when it
issues summonses to third parties. If the Code requires the IRS
to make inquiries into all taxes while also authorizing it to
summon individuals in furtherance of those inquiries,
summonses become an important and integral tool that the IRS
must use to investigate tax liabilities. Even if the summons
authority were considered part of the requirement to assess
taxes, enforcing the notice requirements would not completely
obstruct the IRS’s underlying obligations because notices can
always be reissued. However, given the importance of efficient
revenue collecting, and given the available alternative of the
totality of the circumstances approach, this may be an
appropriate situation to make an exception to the meaning of
“shall.”
B.

United States v. Clarke: A Failed Attempt To Weaken IRS
Authority Supports the Totality of the Circumstances
Approach

The United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Clarke126 is important because it overruled the Eleventh
Circuit’s decision to allow taxpayers evidentiary hearings
123
See Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003); Dolan v. United
States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010).
124
26 U.S.C. § 6201(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
125
Id. § 6201(a)(1) (emphasis added).
126
134 S. Ct. 2361 (2014).
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without first requiring factual support, by balancing the benefits
to the taxpayer against the burden on the IRS and the court
system. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth,
Second, Eleventh, and Sixth circuits were grappling with the
same issues when deciding whether to adopt a totality of the
circumstances approach for Section 7609(a) violations.127
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Clarke is similar
to the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Jewell because both represent
efforts to increase taxpayer leverage against the IRS in attempts
to quash summonses.128 The Eleventh Circuit in Clarke gave
taxpayers the ability to flesh out the purpose of an investigation
in a hearing, which would require the IRS to defend its initial
claim that the purpose was legitimate.129 Similarly, Jewell gives
taxpayers greater ability to quash summonses by holding the IRS
to a higher burden of strict compliance with Section 7609(a).130
Thus, the Court’s decision to overrule the Eleventh Circuit
weakens the Jewell Court’s position.
In United States v. Clarke, the IRS issued five summonses
while investigating the tax liabilities of a company, Dynamo
Holdings Limited Partnership, and then commenced enforcement
proceedings.131 The IRS made a prima facie showing of the four
Powell elements. Then, the taxpayers petitioned to quash on the
ground that the investigation was not “conducted pursuant to a
legitimate purpose.”132 The taxpayers claimed that one reason
the summonses were issued was because the IRS was seeking to
retaliate against the company for refusing to extend a statute of
limitations deadline.133 The court held that the taxpayers were
entitled to a hearing to investigate the purpose of the summons
without presenting factual support for their allegation.134 The
court reasoned: “[R]equiring the taxpayer to provide factual
support for an allegation of an improper purpose, without giving
127

Id. at 2367–68.
United States v. Clarke, 517 F. App’x 689, 690 (11th Cir. 2013).
129
Id. at 691.
130
Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1301 (10th Cir. 2014).
131
Clarke, 517 F. App’x at 690.
132
Id. at 691.
133
Id. During the investigation, the IRS convinced the company to extend the
statute of limitations on its investigation by two years. United States v. Clarke, 134
S. Ct. 2361, 2365 (2014). Towards the end of that extension, the IRS requested
additional time, and shortly after the company refused, the IRS issued the
summonses at issue here. Id. at 2365–66.
134
Clarke, 517 F. App’x at 691.
128
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the taxpayer a meaningful opportunity to obtain such facts,
saddles the taxpayer with an unreasonable circular burden,
creating an impermissible ‘Catch 22.’ ”135
Just one year later, the United States Supreme Court
vacated and remanded the Eleventh Circuit’s decision.136 In
United States v. Clarke, the Court held that a taxpayer is entitled
to a hearing to determine the purpose of a summons only after
presenting specific facts or circumstances that point to an
Concerned that the categorical rule
improper purpose.137
imposed by the Eleventh Circuit would “turn[] every summons
dispute into a fishing expedition for official wrongdoing,” the
Court required taxpayers to offer “credible evidence” in support
of their claim.138 Recognizing the unlikeliness of a taxpayer
having direct evidence of bad faith at this stage of proceedings,
the Court concluded that circumstantial evidence could meet this
burden.139 On remand in district court, however, the evidence
offered raised no “plausible inference” to the court that the IRS
issued the summonses for an improper purpose.140
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Clarke is yet
another example of the Court balancing taxpayer and IRS
interests.141 To deny taxpayers the right to a hearing without
factual support reflects the importance of preserving the
efficiency of the IRS’s investigation and avoiding possible fishing
expeditions. This mirrors the reasoning of the Second, Eleventh,
and Sixth Circuits.142 Their decision to look at the totality of the

135
Id. This circular burden is not the only one sought to be resolved in the
context of enforcing IRS summonses. See cases cited supra note 96. This holding was
also contrary to the decisions of various other courts of appeals. See, e.g., Sugarloaf
Funding, LLC v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 584 F.3d 340, 351 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that
evidentiary hearings during summons enforcement proceedings will only be held, at
the court’s discretion, if the taxpayer introduces evidence to support his allegation of
improper purpose); United States v. Garden State Nat’l Bank, 607 F.2d 61, 71 (3d
Cir. 1979) (explaining that “if . . . the taxpayer . . . cannot factually support a proper
affirmative defense, the district court should dispose of the proceeding . . . without
an evidentiary hearing”).
136
Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2369.
137
Id. at 2365.
138
Id. at 2367–68.
139
Id.
140
United States v. Clarke, Nos. 11-80456-MC, 11-80457-MC-KLR/JMH, 1180459-MC-KLR/JMH, 11-80460-MC-KLR/JMH, 11-80461-MC-KLR/JMH, 2015 WL
1324372, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 18, 2015), aff’d 816 F.3d 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
141
Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2367–68.
142
See supra Section III.A.
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circumstances also focuses on avoiding the inefficiency of
reissuing summonses with proper notice.143 Just like fishing
expeditions, reissuing summonses requires an expenditure of
time and money only to end up in the same place.
On the other hand, Clarke is distinguishable. The hearings
would have taken place, and time and money spent, regardless of
whether the purpose of the summonses was improper. In
contrast, with a Section 7609(a) violation, it is clear from the very
beginning that the IRS has not complied with the Code. Thus,
while it makes sense to cut back on the inefficiency of fishing
expeditions lacking factual support, the argument is not quite as
strong for the inefficiency of reissuing notice because there is
factual evidence of a violation. Nevertheless, because the Clarke
decision implies that when taxpayers show proof of improper
purpose, evidentiary hearings will be allowed,144 it seems just as
equitable that upon proof of late notice, courts will weigh the
facts and circumstances to determine an appropriate solution.
C.

How the Totality of the Circumstances Approach Provides a
Necessary Check on IRS Authority

Although most courts are hesitant to weaken IRS authority,
the totality of the circumstances approach provides courts with
an opportunity to determine when IRS authority has unfairly
burdened taxpayer interests. Despite what seems to be an
overwhelming advantage for the IRS in tax liability
investigations, taxpayers have effectively challenged summonses
on the basis of Section 7609 violations.145 Those challenges,
however, are few and often supplemented by various other
violations of the Code. For example, in Larson v. United States, a
magistrate judge granted a taxpayer’s petition to quash where
the IRS failed to follow numerous administrative steps in the
Code that resulted in a slew of technical violations.146 There, the
taxpayer, Richard Larson, was under IRS investigation for

143

See supra Section III.A.
Clarke, 134 S. Ct. at 2365.
145
See, e.g., Larson v. United States, No. CV 91-151-BLG-JDS, 1992 WL
104791, at *1 (D. Mont. Feb. 6, 1992).
146
Id. at *2–3.
144
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several years of tax liability.147 The IRS agent on the case issued
third-party summonses to three banks and Larson’s
accountant.148
Upon notice, Larson filed a petition to quash the summonses
alleging several problems with the summonses and notice.149
First, the summons served on the accountant did not include an
attested copy of the summons required by Section 7603.150
Second, the notice to Larson of the summonses issued to the
banks was sent twenty-one days prior to examination of the
records, instead of the twenty-three days required by Section
7609(a).151
Third, the court found it questionable that a
summons sent to a bank in Washington was properly served, as
the summons allegedly was served in Washington the same day
it was issued in Montana.152
The court concluded that it could overlook one technical
violation,
but
these
summonses
held
a
“plethora
153
To “overlook, excuse, modify and amend”
of . . . irregularities.”
so many violations “would only condone and encourage
bureaucratic ineptitude.”154 The only reason the court would
have considered enforcing the summonses was that Larson did
not demonstrate that he had been prejudiced by the
inadequacies.155 However, because the IRS failed to demonstrate
that its investigation would be prejudiced should the summonses
be quashed, and because the notice and service requirements are
meant to protect the taxpayer, the court required the IRS to
properly reissue the summons.156
The Larson Court was concerned with preventing
government “ineptitude,”157 which sets a high bar for taxpayers.
Failure to comply with Section 7609(a) alone is unlikely to be
considered ineptitude that would be grounds to quash a
summons. Further, while some courts may quash a summons if

147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157

Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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there is no prejudice to the IRS investigation, many are still not
willing to do so without evident taxpayer prejudice.158 Thus, even
though courts give deference to the IRS’s interests and the
taxpayer’s burden remains extremely high, courts can still check
IRS authority, if necessary.
D. How To Improve the Totality of the Circumstances Approach
Even though the totality of the circumstances approach is
more favorable than a “strict compliance” approach, as it
provides an opportunity for courts to balance competing
interests, courts should conduct a more thorough analysis to
determine if a Section 7609(a) violation has burdened the
taxpayer.
For example, unless a showing of government
ineptitude is made, as in Larson, courts will consider the
taxpayer’s ability to file a petition to quash as a lack of prejudice
However, a
and therefore will not quash a summons.159
taxpayer’s petition will be dismissed if she fails to adhere to the
statutory deadline for filing it.160 Thus, the taxpayer finds herself
in a lose-lose situation, unless there are numerous other
deficiencies with the summons and notice. Courts, therefore,
should conduct a deeper examination of the facts to understand,
and not assume, that there is no prejudice.
Courts could weigh a number of additional factors in each
case to ensure that all interests are considered equally. First,
courts could look into why the IRS agent on the case provided
For example, if that particular agent were
late notice.161
habitually late or careless in providing notice, the overall
inefficiency of that agent would weigh towards quashing the
summons. Second, courts could consider any past dealing or
interactions between the taxpayer and the IRS. More weight
158
See Scott v. United States, No. 1:00CV-215-R, 2001 WL 513398, at *1 (W.D.
Ky. Apr. 3, 2001) (explaining that the Code “requirements have little value if the
court simply turn[s] its head any time the I.R.S. fails to comply . . . . [T]he I.R.S.
should strive for technical compliance . . . .”). But see Kernan v. IRS, CV. No. 0600368 DAE-BMK, 2007 WL 1288155, at *2 (D. Haw. Apr. 30, 2007) (holding that,
while the court does not condone the IRS’s failure to adhere to the Code, because it
found no intentional misconduct on behalf of the IRS, the summons should not be
quashed).
159
See supra Section III.A.
160
See 26 U.S.C. § 7609(b)(2)(B) (2012).
161
In Cook v. United States, the court considered the criminal background of the
taxpayers. 104 F.3d 886, 887 (6th Cir. 1997). Thus, it would not be too far of a leap to
consider the past conduct of the IRS agent.

2017]

THE ENFORCEMENT OF IRS SUMMONSES

301

should be given to a taxpayer with no experience dealing with the
IRS, while more weight should be given to the IRS if the
taxpayer has dealt with the IRS or other governmental agencies
in the past. Third, the court should look beyond simply whether
or not the petition to quash was filed, and consider how difficult
filing became because of late notice. For example, a taxpayer
with a professional occupation and decent financial means may
be able to promptly contact an attorney and file the petition
without much added stress, but someone of limited education and
financial means may be greatly burdened by the same delay.
Any prejudice found to have affected the taxpayer should
then be weighed against any prejudice the IRS faced. Although
the facts in Larson were unique, the court suggested an
examination of prejudice to the investigation itself.162 If the
additional twenty-three days needed to reissue a third-party
summons with proper notice would unreasonably burden the IRS
in that particular investigation, then the petition to quash should
be denied. If not, all of the interests should be balanced. This
approach may consume court resources, but it may also motivate
the IRS to issue timely notices without having to enforce a strict
interpretation of Section 7609(a).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the split between the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Eleventh, and Sixth Circuits, represents
the difficulty in interpreting a law in light of competing policy
concerns. The Tenth Circuit focused on the plain meaning of the
law and canons of statutory interpretation, holding the IRS to
the strict letter of the law. The Second, Eleventh, and Sixth
circuits looked to the totality of the circumstances and focused on
the purpose of the law, to give taxpayers time to file a petition to
quash, and the burden that would fall on the IRS. The former
interpretation gives clear guidelines for the IRS and the taxpayer
as to when a summons may be quashed.
The latter
interpretation is not as clear, but encompasses the context in
which the law was enacted and its practical application.

162
Larson v. United States, No. CV 91-151-BLG-JDS, 1992 WL 104791, at *4
(D. Mont. Feb. 6, 1992).
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While most courts tend to lean towards the latter
interpretation, some of those courts have also warned the IRS
that it should strive to adhere to the statute. Nevertheless,
courts do not want to be so technical with the IRS as to hinder
investigations.
Therefore, rather than enforcing an overly
technical application of the law, a totality of the circumstances
approach allows for a thorough balancing of taxpayer and IRS
interests.

